Hilbert College

by Sandra, Coutney, Meg, Alyssa

Working with the FBI the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) camped outside the compound with a complete command post and FBI agents in armored vehicles. For the next forty-nine days, with the help of newly appointed Attorney General Janet Reno, the government made several attempts to lure the members out of the compound. Fruitless negotiations took place during this time period. On the morning of April 19, 1993 the Waco Branch Davidian compound, Mount Carmel Center became engulfed in flames. This resulted in the death of more than 80 Branch Davidians in the compound. (www.bps.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/waco/timeline.html)

After the tragic ending to a fatal standoff, controversy became the main topic in the Waco siege. Almost seven years later the question at hand is; did the government go too far? Janet Reno, the few survivors from the compound, and the media are all seeking the answer to this question. Janet Reno has recently appointed former Senator John Danforth to investigate and find the truth behind the fifty-one day standoff. (www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html)

The first question is: did government agents fire into the Branch Davidian compound first? On February 28, 1993 when government officials went to the compound to arrest David Koresh and conduct the search procedure and the situation got out of control. Unknown people fired shots and several died on this day. This may be the most difficult question that Danforth will explore. It is going to be very complex for Danforth to distinguish what went on that day with so many contradicting stories.

Several scenarios have been proposed. The first scenario presented starts with shootings from the FBI helicopters that flew over the Davidian compound. However, BATF agents insist that the Branch Davidian members started shooting at the helicopter and they retaliated.

In the second scenario, the shooting began with David Koresh at the front door of the compound. When BATF agents were approaching the compound David Koresh opened the front door, grinned, and slammed the door shut. Government agents attempted to identify themselves and explain their purpose for being there. Koresh then proceeded to fire through the steel door located in the front of the compound. At the trial of the Branch Davidians this was the scenario the government claimed under oath. (Korel and Blackman, p.130)

The third scenario began as David Koresh opened the front door to the compound and yelled at BATF agents that there were women and children in the compound and to stop. While he was trying to stop the agents from bombarding the compound David Koresh was shot with a machine gun equipped with a silencer. After Koresh was shot Branch Davidians responded with their firearms. (Korel B and Blackman, p.130)

The final scenario presented began when a BATF agent shot at one of the Branch Davidian dogs. BATF agents were instructed to control the dogs with fire extinguishers. If this was not enough to control the dogs they were granted permission to use their firearms. When the shot was fired each side assumed the other began shooting and retaliated. (Korel and Blackman, p.130)

There were also other pieces of evidence admitted to the FBI for Danforth to investigate. The FBI was given videotape that was taken on the day of February 28, 1993 in front of the compound. Included in the videotape were several flashes of light minutes before the shoot out between the BATF agents and the government occurred. These flashes were assumed to be gunfire. Two experts were brought in to analyze the tapes. The expert for the government claimed these flashes of light could have been a reflection off of any object that was metal from the sun. The expert for the Branch Davidians said it was "unmistakably due to gunfire". (www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html)

Each government official involved in the siege was placed under oath at a trial and asked if they shot their firearms or knew of any premature firing by the agents at the scene. "All of the agents involved in the siege claimed they knew of no premature firing. One government official, Charles Riley claimed that he had heard gunshots coming from one of the agents". Later, while under oath at the trial Riley retracted his statement. (www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html)

Finding the mistake that led to a shoot out between government agents and the Branch Davidian members is going to be very complex. However, each member of the siege was questioned about the first shot. Now that Koresh and close to eighty of his members are deceased the government will not be able to get testimony from them. Their side of the controversy could be very helpful at this point.

The second question Danforth will attempt to answer is; did the government start the fire that killed eighty people at Mount Carmel Center. Upon analyzing this question, the first step is to investigate whether the weaponry used by BATF agents could have started the fire. In an attempt to lure the members of the Branch Davidian out of their compound BATF agents engaged teargas near the compound. Attorney general Janet Reno instructed a plan that under no circumstance was there to be pyrotechnic weaponry used. The FBI and BATF agents used US military 40mm shell casing to disperse the tear gas. This type of casing is flammable and therefore could have caused the deadly fire to the compound. (Klaidman and Isikoff, p27)

On the other side of the controversy government agents fired the tear gas six hours before the fire even started. Government officials say the tear gas casing were not responsible for the fire at all. (www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html) . In fact there is evidence on several audiotapes that contain several of the Branch Davidians members talking about the need to pour fuel around the compound to start the fire. (Klaidman and Isikoff, p.27)

The third question of the investigation is: did government officials cover up details of the incident? The Danforth investigation began when Reno admitted military style pyrotechnic gas had been used. This all came to light this past summer after Reno had testified the government did not use these materials. On the 49th page of a dry FBI crime-lab report the government made notes of an U.S. military 40mm shell casing being fired. These casings are the types that can catch fire (Klaidman and Isikoff, p27). Although Reno had prohibited usage of these military weapons, they were used by the BATF. When the crime-lab was turned over to investigators in 1995, page 49 was mysteriously missing.

Furthermore, the Branch Davidians developed a two-hour video explaining themselves and their beliefs during the second week of negotiations. Unfortunately, the government refused to release this tape out of fear of humanizing the cult to the American people. (Korel and Blackman, p.130)

Janet Reno started a plan of action that called for 48 hours of inserting tear gas. Tanks would then punch holes into the compound. Jamar, a FBI commander, and Rogers, head of FBI, spent just a few hours inserting tear gas before they started making holes in the compound. When questioned, Jamar claimed this was part of the original plan. Contrary to this statement, Rogers insisted the tanks were not consistent with the plan because the holes would have created escape routes for the Davidians.

The evidence we have encountered for question three during our research shows there are definite signs of a cover-up. However, it does not appear to be a government conspiracy. "Some agents made poor decisions but there was not a collective effort for a cover up." (Tipson.) The government has admitted that they made several mistakes but it seems individuals have concealed their own mistakes, not the FBI or BATF.

The fourth and final question Danforth will try to answer is; Was the military used illegally by the government during the siege? Looking back on the situation it's easy for everyone to say the government could have gone about the whole situation in a more efficient and effective manner. (www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html)

Some critics of the BATF suggested they should have attempted to arrest Koresh when he was alone and outside the Branch Davidian. BATF agents claimed it was too difficult to find Koresh off the grounds of Mount Carmel Center, which had been under surveillance since January 1993. (Korel and Blackman, p.130)

Contrary to the BATF's claim of not being able to find Koresh, there were numerous sightings in the two months before the raid. February 22, 1993 Koresh was seen at an auto repair shop in Waco. Once a week during February Koresh was reportedly served at the Chelsea Bar and Grill. He also visited a junkyard three days before the siege took place. He also took regular trips to the grocery store and went jogging daily. (Korel and Blackman, p.130)

The government's attempt to put surveillance on David Koresh and arrest him outside of the compound was extremely weak. Koresh revealed on several audiotapes that government officials could have arrested him on his jogs or trips to the grocery store. He also said, "Nobody is going to come to my home, with my babies around, shaking guns around, without getting a gun back in their face. That's the American way." (The New Republic, Vol. 208. N25. P.10)

However, the question at hand deals with the illegal use of the military. BATF Executive Daniel Hartnett said, "We use the military all the time, as does the FBI, Secret Service, and other Federal Agencies". The FBI and BATF called upon the military units for various kinds of assistance in this siege. For example they were dealing with suspected drug-related activity and an abundant amount of illegal explosives and firearms. In this situation the FBI and BATF thought it was best to bring in the military in due to the amount of people and firearms and explosives they were up against. (Korel and Blackman p.130)

Although there is no exact procedure for a siege the government could have gone other routes when dealing with the Waco Branch Davidians. Each siege is a unique situation and has its own procedure usually directed by a government official. However, bringing 76 agents into a full fledge siege might scream for mistakes. The more people you have on an operation the more chance for mistakes. (Ruppel.)

Overall, the government probably took the correct steps because of the threat of explosives and firearms. However, they could have eliminated the entire siege by doing a more in depth surveillance watch on David Koresh. Arresting Koresh outside of the compound would have left his members without a leader and the search would have probably gone much smoother. (The New Republic, Vol. 208. N25. P.10)

The results of this research into the Waco siege point strongly to the conclusion that the major errors were by fault of the government. But, two proposals address the problem law enforcement official's face whenever they must negotiate with a religious community. First, communication is a must. It was obvious that worldview interpreters were no where to be found at the time of the Waco standoff. As a result each side acted as a complete misunderstanding of the other sides concerns. The second proposal is that religious communities are represented accurately before the general public. For instance religious groups could invite researchers to visit their communities or groups could issue a press release so that opinion makers could at least have an unbiased opinion. (Reavis, P.212)

"Tragedies like Waco occur because people and institutions become isolated within their own worldviews. Given our society's mushrooming religious diversity and it's accompanying expansion of state police power, both sides would do well to keep the lines of communication as open and clear as possible." (Reavis, P.212)

Works Cited and Consulted

Reavis, Dick J. The Ashes of Waco. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Korel, David B. and Blackman, Paul H. No more Waco. Amherst, New York: Prometheous, 1997.

Lewis, James R. From The Ashes: Making Sense of Waco. Littlefield, New York: Rowman, 1994.

Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff. "A Fire That Won't Die." Newsweek, 27 (4).

Chua-Eoan, Howard. "The Return of Waco." Time, vol.154, 32 (3).

Ruppel, William J. Personal Interview. February 10,2000. (Professor of Criminal Justice at University of South Carolina).

Tipson, Jeffrey. Personal Interview. February 10, 2000. (Assistant to Dr. Montgomery, Professor of Criminal Justice at University of South Carolina).

Tharp, Robert S. "An Intelligence Officer Considers Conspiracy Theories." Gale Group, 1999.

"The New Republic". June 21, 1993 Volume 208. N25. P.10

Nichols, Bruce. " Lawyers complain of secrecy on U.S. documents about cult." http://www.dallasnews.com/specials/waco/federal/w0313b.htm (03-13-93).

Unknown. "Davidian Time Line". http://geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/1400/koreshtime.html. (No date given).

Unknown. "Waco: The Inside Story." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/waco/timeline.html. (No date given).

Freivogel, William F. and Ganey, Terry. "The answers to four questions will tell the tale of Waco." http://www.postnet.com/postnet/waco.html. (10-24-99).