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The Public's Right to Know

    By: Neil Hodge, Erin Hudson, Dargan Odom, and Margaret Wilson

A prestigious investigative television program discovers information that can affect the health of millions of Americans; do they have an obligation to inform the public? 60 Minutes was faced with this issue when they went head to head with Brown & Williamson, the third leading tobacco company in the United States. Many journalists are plagued with this question resulting in journalists taking less risk and becoming less persistent in their quest for the truth.

    Dr. Jeffery Wigand, the highest ranking tobacco insider to turn whistle-blower (Gleick, "Where There's Smoke") , is at the heart of this question. Wigand worked for many different companies before joining the Brown & Williamson tobacco team. He worked in the corporate development department of Pfizer, a large drug company. He then moved to Japan to work as marketing director for Union Carbid. After he left that job, he worked as a Senior Vice President at Technicon Instruments. His project there was to market blood testing equipment. In 1989, Wigand was fired from Technicon Instruments after many high level jobs were done away with. That is when Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company entered the picture (Mollenkamp 111-112).

 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company is the subsidiary of British American Tobacco or B.A.T Industries Plc, the second largest cigarette manufacturer in the world. They distribute the KOOL and GPC brands of cigarettes in America. They also produce specialty and loose tobacco products. Brown & Williamson is ranked third behind Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds and holds 16 percent of the market (Brown and Williamson).

 Wigand was lured to Brown & Williamson with a promise of allowing him to reach and produce a safer cigarette. Wigand was appointed Vice President of Research and Development in their Louisville office. They offered him a $300,000 salary, $30 million budget and a staff of 243 people. His job was to create a safer cigarette, with lower nicotine and lower tar, to compete with Philip Morris's Premiere cigarette (Mollenkamp 112).

 When Wigand started working at Brown & Williamson, Tommy Sandefur was the chairman of the Louisville Company. Three months after Philip Morris abandoned their Premiere cigarette project; Sandufer pulled the plug on Wigand's research into developing a safer cigarette. Over the next few years, Wigand had many run-ins with Sandufer over the use of addictive additives to tobacco. Coumarin was being added to the tobacco even though there was proof that it caused cancer in laboratory rats (Mollenkamp 112).

 In 1993, Sandefur was made CEO of Brown & Williamson, and three months later, on March 24, Wigand was fired from Brown & Williamson. His severance agreement allowed him to receive his salary for the next two years as well as health benefits. The benefits were of crucial importance to Wigand, whose oldest daughter Rachel was suffering from spinal bifida. She required expensive surgery, and they desperately needed the health benefits to help pay for the procedures (Mollenkamp 112-113).

 In September 1993, Brown & Williamson sued Wigand for breach of his severance contract. They were charging him with revealing details about his separation agreement to a colleague. They removed his health benefits. By November 1993, Brown & Williamson had gotten Wigand to sign a life long confidentiality agreement. The terms of this agreement prohibited Wigand from publicly disclosing any information about the company, and he could be sued if he was found to be in violation of this agreement. His medical benefits were restored and his daughter could get the care that she needed (Mollenkamp 113).

 In September of 1993, the Justice Department summoned Jeffrey Wigand. Brown & Williamson, fearful that he would violate the terms of his confidentiality agreement, provided him with a lawyer to protect his interests. Shortly after Wigand's testimony before the Justice Department, the first agreement was signed with 60 Minutes. In the beginning, Jeffrey Wigand was to work for no more than ten days to provide a confidential report on the Philip Morris that was being debated in Congress. The first contract between Jeffrey Wigand and 60 Minutes specifically stated that he would not appear on air, and that he would under no circumstances discuss Brown & Williamson. For 60 Minutes, Jeffrey Wigand made the perfect expert witness. He was knowledgeable about the tobacco industry and understood all of the technical terms being discussed. The time that Jeffrey Wigand spent working on the Philip Morris case was the beginning of a very complicated relationship with CBS. After 60 Minutes ran its piece on the Philip Morris case Lowell Bergman continued to call Wigand periodically for information (Grossman 41).

 During this period of time, Jeffrey Wigand was becoming a notorious expert witness for the anti-smoking campaign that was sweeping the country. In an effort to honor his nondisclosure agreement with Brown & Williamson, Wigand informed his former employer about the testimony that he was about to give before the Justice Department (Urey 306). However, he felt no need to inform them about his discussion with CBS and 60 Minutes. Despite his efforts to keep his discussions with 60 Minutes under wraps, controversy was already surrounding him because of his frequent expert testimony about tobacco. He had already begun to receive death threats (Grossman 47).

 Throughout the early summer of 1995 Jeffrey Wigand wrestled with the decision about whether or not to appear on camera for CBS. Although he felt the need to reveal what he knew about the dirty dealings of the tobacco industry, he was fearful of being sued for breach of his nondisclosure agreement with Brown &Williamson. Negotiations between Wigand and CBS continued into June of 1995. Wigand's lawyers were pushing for all of their client's legal fees to be paid in the event of a lawsuit. In July 60 Minutes learned that Wigand was about to be summoned by the Justice Department, and they began to push even harder to get him on camera. CBS desperately needed the interview before they could become in danger of violating a court order (Grossman 43).

 On August 3, 1995, Jeffrey Wigand finally agreed to be interviewed by Mike Wallace. The interview would be shown at a later date. Bergman gave Wigand a handwritten note stating that the interview would not be aired without his permission in an attempt to quiet his fears (Orey 306). They were to discuss the matter again on September 3, 1995. Richard Scruggs, Wigand's attorney, reached an indemnity agreement with CBS. After CBS reached the indemnity agreement, news of the story began to leak throughout the "Black Rock" headquarters at CBS (Grossman 43).

 During this time, CBS corporate headquarters decided to take a look at the situation. They had many intense meetings that involved the executives and CBS lawyers. In October of 1995, outside counsel for CBS warned of the risks of running the story. CBS searched for a way to safely air the story without putting themselves in a very vulnerable position legally. Throughout these meetings they reviewed the facts of the Wigand interview. One thing that weighed heavy on CBS's mind was that Wigand was a witness at the Philip Morris - R.J. Reynolds suit against ABC. Brown & Williamson intervened and Wigand was not allowed to be a witness for them. According to Grossman: "The case against ABC paying Philip Morris a reported $15 million for legal cost and apologizing for the story was much on everyone's mind" (43). They wanted 60 Minutes to run the story but they needed to find a way to lower the risk that could go along with it (Grossman 43).

 The risk was tremendous for 60 Minutes. If the interview was aired, then CBS might have a billion dollars lawsuit facing them from Brown & Williamson. Brown & Williamson threatened CBS that they would hold them responsible for any libel included in the contract. Because they were no monetary limits put on this type of lawsuit in Kentucky; court costs could force them to lose the company. CBS was also afraid of a lawsuit from Brown & Williamson with a claim "that the network induced Wigand to breach his confidentiality agreement" (Orey 306-307). Another important aspect when deciding whether or not to run the story was dealing with arrangements that 60 Minutes had made with Wigand. CBS lawyers promised Wigand "to indemnify him against a suit for libel and some form of assurance he was given that the report would not appear without his consent" (Carter, "Dispute Erupts"). CBS explained that this was not to give Wigand veto power, however, to be courteous to his personla situation. On September 6, 1995, after reviewing all of this information, CBS felt that the interview held to much risk and decided to not run the interview (Grossman 43).

 However, there was speculation if Laurence Tish or Westinghouse Electric had to do with the decision (Grossman 43). Laurence Tish was the chairman of CBS and his family controlled the country's fourth largest cigarette company, Lorillard. The issue with Westinghouse was that they were in the process of purchasing CBS. "?Westinghouse shareholders would certainly not have been happy to acquire a billion dollar lawsuit along with the network" (Orey 307).

 It did not take the media very long to catch wind of the situation. On November 9, 1995, the New York Times ran an article about CBS having a planned interview with a former tobacco executive that was going to criticize the industry. The article went on to reveal that CBS would not run the interview, because they are afraid of a lawsuit from the Tobacco Company. They speculated that the executive might have broken a silence contract with the company and CBS might be held responsible for it. (Grossman 45). Throughout this time, different people at CBS lashed out about the situation to the media. Dan Rather made comments on a radio show and Mike Wallace was quoted in The Washington Post (45).

 In place of the scheduled interview, on November 12, 60 Minutes ran a report on how the tobacco industry blocks information from the public. Only a small piece of the Wigand interview was included and they did not include his name or face. At the end of the show, Mike Wallace expressed his disappointment, " 'That CBS had seen fit to give in to perceived threats of legal action against us by a tobacco industry?We lost out, only to some degree on this one, but we haven't the slightest doubt that we'll be able to continue the 60 Minutes tradition of reporting such pieces in the future without fear or favor '" (qtd. in Grossman 45). The day after the show, interviewer Mike Wallace and Morley Safer appeared on Charlie Rose, a PBS late night talk show. Throughout the show, they expressed their unhappiness with the decision not to air the original. They also stated that Wigand was not paid or forced by CBS to come forward, he did it on his own and therefore, CBS should not be held responsible if the first interview would have been shown (48).

 On November 16th and 17th the media got a lot of crucial information. On the 16th, The Wall Street Journal found out that CBS had given the source $12,000 to consult for a previous show. They also found out that CBS would protect him against a libel lawsuit and that the source had veto power over the airing of the show. On the 17th The New York Daily News, revealed Jeffrey Wigand's name as the source. They also published sections of the transcript of the original interview.

 When his name was revealed, Brown & Williamson sued Wigand (Orey 407). The company prepared a campaign to attack Wigand's character. Almost immediately Brown & Williamson began trying to discredit Jeffrey Wigand as a reliable witness (309). Richard Scruggs wrote to Wigand, "Obviously, they will resort to all means (legal and probably illegal) to discredit and intimidate you." In early 1996, they delivered a 500-page paper attacking his character. Wigand was accused of crimes ranging from spousal abuse to shoplifting. An article in the Wall Street Journal charged that he was a "Jekyll and Hyde personality" (Time 1996). However, most of the allegations against Jeffrey Wigand have been found to be unfounded and untrue. Brown & Williamson made mountains out of molehills when it came to Wigand's character (Orey 308-310).

 Despite these attempts, large amounts of incriminating information had already come out about the industry. Orey states: "Although Wigand did not emerge untarnished, it was the cigarette maker that came out the clear loser" (310). Following Wigand, three more whistle blowers emerged.

 With all this out in the open, 60 Minutes was finally allowed to air a revised story on February 4, 1996. Mike Wallace, a long-term correspondent at CBS, was the interviewer. It showed the never seen before footage of the original interview. At the beginning of the interview, Mike Moore attorney general in Mississippi states: "The information that Jeffrey has, I think is the most important information that has ever come out against the tobacco industry"(Wigand). The interview shows footage of tobacco company executives swearing oath to tell the truth before Congress in April 1994. In the interview Wigand states that Sandefur, president of Brown & Williamson, perjured himself in Congress. Wigand tells Wallace that he feels Brown & Williamson: "clearly misstated what they commonly knew as a language within the company. That we're a nicotine delivery business" (Wigand). Wigand also tells Wallace that Brown & Williamson manipulates and adjust the nicotine, by enhancing the effect of the nicotine through reuse of chemical additives like ammonia. This additive allows nicotine to absorb faster in the lungs and then this will affect the brain and central nervous system (Wigand).

 There are documents in California that support Wigand's claims. Wallace tells how Merrell Williams, a former paralegal from Brown & Williamson law firm, took confidential documents and they ended up with Dr. Staton Gantz in California. Gantz wrote a series of articles from this information exposing the tobacco industry in the Journal of the American Medical Association. While interviewing Gantz, he tells Wallace the documents show that Brown & Williamson "knew nicotine was an addictive drug and they knew smoking caused cancer and other diseases" (Wigand). The documents reveal that Brown & Williamson kept that knowledge from the public using legal strategies. The documents say over and over that cigarettes are a nicotine delivery instrument. These documents support Wigand's claims that he made against Brown & Williamson.

 Throughout the interview, Wigand tells Wallace that he was hired to create a safer cigarette by reducing carcinogenic components. While at Brown & Williamson, Wigand went to a meeting of scientist to develop a safer cigarette. However, Wigand explains when it was time to write the minutes from the meeting, Brown & Williamson's lawyers intervened and they were rewritten by Kendrick Wells, a staff attorney for Brown & Williamson. The parts that used the word safer cigarette were edited out. Wallace explains, if their evidence shows that Brown & Williamson cigarettes are unsafe, then it can be used against them in court (Wigand).

 Wigand told how he questioned Sandefur, the president. According to Wigand, Sandefur stated: "I don't want to hear any more discussion about a safer cigarette?We pursue a safer cigarette, it would put us under extreme exposure with every other product" (Wigand). While working at Brown & Williamson, Wigand also discovered that a substance called glycerol is used in their cigarettes. Glycerol forms a substance known as acrolein, and acrolein can cause the lungs to not clear up properly. Wigand tell 60 Minutes that it is still used in their products. Also the drug coumarin, which causes tumors in the livers of mice, was used in Sir Walter Raleigh aromatic pipe tobacco until at least 1992. When Wigand stated that he did not want to work with this product he was told "that we would continue working on a substitute and we weren't going to remove it because it would impact sales?" (Wigand). Wallace then questions if Brown & Williamson was blatantly ignoring health considerations, Wigand answered "most certainly" (Wigand).

 The interview tells about Wigand getting fired, threats made on his children and getting sued. However, Wigand's words throughout the interview are enough to crush Brown & Williamson along with the entire tobacco industry. After the interview, it is apparent that Brown & Williamson would do anything to prevent this interview from coming forward (Wigand).

 Was CBS protected by the first amendment? Dr. Erik Collins, former director of Corporate Communications for Phillip Morris and current Media Law Professor at USC, believes they were. Collins said, "CBS is always covered by the first amendment. However there are many exceptions to the first amendment. CBS could have easily been sued for defamation or torturous interference." Some journalists believe that 60 minutes had an obligation to run this story, Jane E. Kirtley, executive director of the reporter's committee for freedom of the press said, "It is a sad day for the first amendment when journalists back off from a truthful story that the public needs to know because of fears that they might be sued over the way they got the information."(Grossman 47) Because the story was one of public interest CBS should not have worried about getting sued.

 Collins believes that 60 Minutes was not wrong in pursuing the story. He said, "60 Minutes is a sensational show and this is a sensational story." He also believes that CBS took the correct legal position in not running the story. The lawyers for CBS try to get everything on the air. So if the lawyers say take it off they must believe that there is no way of avoiding a lawsuit. Collins said, "Ethically they should not open themselves and their shareholders up to a lawsuit."

 Though many question the validity of Dr. Jeffery Wigand accusations, the confidential documents uncovered by Merell Williams established credibility for Wigand's story. Once the legal smoke cleared the actions of Brown & Williamson and Big Tobacco were exposed to the public. 60 minutes received criticism for the decisions they made to avoid legal repercussions. It is the journalist's responsibility to effectively inform the public and this sometimes requires taking chances.


Bibliography

Applebome, Peter. "The Stopwatch Keeps Ticking In a Squabble Over Egos and Truth." New York Times 13 July 1999: E1 & E7.

Blum, Andrew. "Tobacco Cases." National Law Journal 11 Mar. 1996: A8.

Carter, Bill. "Mike Wallace Getting Over It." New York Times 3 Nov. 1999: E9.

Collins,Erik. Personal Interview. 9 Feb. 2000.

- - -. "Tobacco Company Sues Former Executive over CBS Interview." New York Times 22 Nov. 1995: A14.

- - -. "Dispute Erupts at '60 Minutes' Over Canceling of Interview." New York Times 18 Nov. 1995: A10.

Gleick, Elizabeth. "Jeffery Wigand Doesn't Live Here Anymore." Time 11 Mar. 1996: 57.

- - -. "Where There's Smoke?" Time 12 Feb. 1996: 54.

Goodman, Walter. "Enough Smoking Guns to Go Around." New York Times 14 Nov. 1995: C18.

- - -. "When the Whistle-Blower Has to Make a Choice." New York Times 24 Nov. 1999: E2.

Grossman, Lawerence. " CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen Interview." Columbia Journalism Review Jan./Feb. 1996: 39-51.

Hwang, Suein. "Brown & Williamson Deposes Wigand, Ex-Research Chief, Attacks Credibility." Wall Street Journal 19 July 1996: B10.

- - -. "Tobacco Company Seeks to Counter Wigand Statements." Wall Street Journal 17 July 1996: B8.

- - -. "Brown & Williamson Sues Ex-Executive Over Information Leaks to '60 Minutes'." Wall Street Journal 22 Nov. 1995: A3 & A6.

Lacayo, Richard. "Truth & Consequences." Time 1 Nov. 1999: 92-95, 98.

Mollenkamp, Carrick, Adam Levy, Joseph Menn and Jeffery Rothfeder. The People v. Big Tobacco. Princeton: Bloomberg Press, 1998.

Orey, Michael. Assuming The Risk: The Mavericks, The Lawyers, And The Whistle-Blowers Who Beat Big Tobacco. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999.

Rich, Frank. "Is Mike Wallace ready for His Close-Up?" New York Times 17 July 1999: A13.

Wigand, Jeffery. Interveiw with Mike Wallace. 60 Minutes. CBS, New York. 4 Feb. 1996.

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