What Really Happened at My Lai Four
- Home -
- Students -
- Tutorials -
- Student Papers -
by Jaye Linnen, David Mullen, and Lauren Vergona
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imagine this: You're a young child and your parents tell you to go and clean up your room. What do you do? Or imagine that you are a student at the local university and your college biology professor tells you that in order to pass the class, every student will have to dissect a whale. Though the thought of dissection is appalling to you, you know this is a situation where you have no choice. Now take for instance everyday life. The bulk of us obey the law. It's only natural that when someone in a higher position of authority: a parent, a teacher, a boss, or a police officer tells us to do something, we'll do it (Hamilton 118). Right or wrong?
Well what if you went away to clean your room, obeying your mother, only to find your father furious that your room was in order? Or what if you dissected the whale and your philosophy professor failed you because dissection is immoral? What had you done wrong? You'd followed orders so your actions were justifiable, right?
Now imagine that you are the second lieutenant in combat and your commanding officer tells you to round up your troops, march them into war, and kill everything in sight. While this situation is much more austere and complex for the majority of us to imagine, for a lieutenant or a soldier in the midst of war, there would be no question. "An order's an order: obey it," most GI's would say (Sack 91). And "obey" they feel they have to. But can you imagine if you marched your troops into war, killed hundreds of innocent women and children, and later found out that you were being charged with murder? Sounds almost absurd to some, especially those that know little about Vietnam or the My Lai massacre. It, however, is not irrational to one individual. Meet Lieutenant William Laws "Rusty" Calley; the man who knows exactly what it feels like to "represent the United States of America" one day and only a few years later, stand on trial for it (Sack 106).
The introduction to this piece might seem a bit ludicrous, but in actuality it is not. William Calley wasn't a special case of a lieutenant or a raging human being that woke up one day and wanted to kill and rape numerous innocent people. In fact, in high school, Calley was much like you or me. His closer friends remember him as a popular guy with "plenty of money and girlfriends." Some will admit none-the-less that "He has often been painted as a loser. But Rusty was a real ladies' man. And his sense of loyalty was wonderful. If you had a problem at 3:30 in the morning, Rusty would be there for you'" (Hewitt). While he was often known for his poor grades and had to leave college as a result of them, on July 26, 1966, he found his calling when he enlisted in the Army.
A few years later when Calley became second lieutenant, it was a huge deal for him. And although he was only 5 ft. 3 in. and overall not a handsome young man, he went into his position to do his best and fight for what he believed in. While his new position was extremely dangerous, many of the soldiers in his company, Charlie Company to be more specific, felt he was ill - suited and had a lack of respect for him (Linder).
Some of the GI's in Charlie Company "thought Calley acted like a small guy who had been pushed around a lot by bigger people before he joined the army. [Others] commented that there was something about him that rubbed people the wrong way" (Bilton and Sim 73-74). No matter, Charlie Company's commanding officer, Ernest Medina, more than likely had an influence on the company's opinion. Medina was well - respected and faith in him was high. Often, however, he would refer to Calley as "Lieutenant Shithead" or respond to him by saying, "Listen sweetheart" (Bilton and Sim 74). Still, many feel that Calley would always do what Medina wanted because Calley looked up to him and wished to be thought of as a "supertrooper" (Hewitt). Whether the way in which Calley's soldiers spoke of him was a result of their personal opinion or a result of the way in which Medina spoke to him, is unknown. No matter, there was much antipathy towards Lt. William Calley.
If you're wondering how Charlie Company could ever be successful under officers that they only half respected, don't. V. Lee Hamilton of Wayne State University and Dorothy J. Hochreich of the University of Connecticut are two of the many psychologists that have tried to understand this as well. They have studied why Charlie Company listened to Lt. Calley and why Calley listened to Medina when they were told to march into the village of My Lai and kill everything in sight. While their conclusions were vast and overwhelmingly complicated to us, their studies were interesting in relation to what occurred in My Lai.
The Milgram experiment of 1974 parallels Calley's situation quite perfectly. This was the experiment in which volunteers had to give shocks to other volunteers every time they made a mistake on a learning task. While the one being shocked was really just pretending to be hurt and effected, the volunteer performing the shock kept obeying his instructions to increase the strength of the shocks. This is human. Following orders, given the chain of command is human whether we respect our commander-in-chief or we don't (Hamilton 124).
As Sergeant Raymond A. Crowe states,
On March 16, 1968, at 7:22 A.M., Charlie Company took off in nine helicopters prepared for what awaited them at My Lai 4. A deep drainage ditch marked one side of the village, which had about 700 residents. The other sides were made up of thick foliage and an open area used for meetings (Linder). Only 38 minutes later, Calley's platoon had begun to destroy everything. The killing, stabbing, and rapes began. To say the least, the My Lai Massacre was in effect. The villagers, both men and women alike, begged for their lives; their pleas falling on seemingly deaf ears.
As the villagers continued to yell, pray and run for help, Calley proceeded to give orders. At one point, Calley told soldier Paul Meadlo, "You know what I want you to do with them" ( Faculty). By this he meant that he wanted Meadlo and the rest of the soldiers to get rid of the people that they had gathered up. This group of people consisted of men, women, the elderly, teenagers, children and infants. Medina wanted his men to "kill everything" (Sack 109). While Medina denies ever saying this; Sergeants, GI's, and Lt. Calley all disagree, saying that Medina was well aware of his plan. Not long after Calley's orders, Medina's plan was in effect. Shots rang out and innocent civilians were killed.
"Before you knew it, everyone was shooting animals, people, anything"
(Hewitt). Medina claims that he told his men to "use common sense," but
others claim that his orders were much different. "We were to leave nothing
walking, crawling, or growing. He said everybody would be destroyed" (Sack
90).
For some, the thought of the elderly and infants being shot is the most tormenting vision of all. It was the job of the soldiers to protect themselves from the enemy, and to them, the enemies were the "VC's". "In a war, and especially the Vietnam War . . . we were ordered to shoot back at the enemy, but we must first wait to be fired on first . . . that he did . . . Lt. Calley waited till he was fired on first and then pardon the expression .. . . but 'ALL HELL BROKE LO[O]SE'" (Crowe). At one point during the massacre, however, Calley saw a 2-year-old boy who had somehow survived the shootings. With this, he picked up the young child, threw him into a ditch, and shot him to death (Linder). "Sure women and children was killed . . . that's true in any war . . . there will be innocent people killed in any war . .. . so I quote again "Lt. Calley was just obeying orders from Capt. Medina from the chain of command" (Crowe).
Medina's actual arrival at My Lai 4 is unknown. While some say that he witnessed the operation by 9 A.M., others say that he did not arrive until around 10A.M. Still, Medina was keeping up with Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker who was regularly checking in to see how things were going. And by 8:30 A.M., "Medina told him that the body count was 84 enemy killed, and Barker relayed the additional KIA to the tactical operations center" (Bilton and Sim 114).
To the vast majority, the thought of 80 or more people being shot to death in less than an hour is devastating as well as gruesome. But the nightmare only got worse, as photographer Ronald Haeberle witnessed, as he followed the third platoon into the village. A fourth year photography major in Cleveland, Ohio, Haeberle felt the pressures of the chain of command just as much as Meadlo and Calley. "I knew that it was something that shouldn't be happening but yet I was a part of it," Haeberle said. "I kept taking pictures. That was my job as a photographer, to take pictures . . . I feel sometimes that the camera did take over during the operation . . . nothing was pre-thought, just the normal reaction of a photographer" (Bilton and Sim 124). So, like a child told to clean his room or a student told to perform a perhaps unethical task, Haeberle, too, was a part of the My Lai massacre.
He continued throughout the village, catching the scenes with his camera. After the massacre, he did not report the atrocity to his commanding officers, a neglected action for which he was later heavily criticized. However, during the court-martial that followed, his photographs provided proof that women and children were among the victims at My Lai.
Lieutenant Hugh C. Thompson was the pilot of a helicopter flying the reconnaissance mission over the My Lai 4 area that day. His orders were to "recon out in front of the friendly forces and draw fire, and then tell them where the enemy was" (Thompson). As Thompson and his small crew made their first pass, he noticed a "draft-age" male running out of the village with a weapon. Thompson was later quoted as saying "that was the only enemy person I saw that whole day" (Thompson).
After making several passes, the helicopter crew noticed that there were large amounts of Vietnamese bodies everywhere. Thompson landed his aircraft near the large ditch that had served as a firing range earlier. The crew noticed a lot of movement in the ditch and asked a sergeant if they could help the wounded civilians. According to Thompson, the sergeant's reply was that he would help them out of their misery (Thompson). Lieutenant Thompson says he thought the officer was "joking." While leaving, Thompson's door gunner, Larry Colburn, saw the sergeant firing into the ditch.
Thompson realized the situation was becoming grossly out of control. He and his crew agreed that the slaying would have to be stopped. Thompson spotted several My Lai citizens huddled in a bunker. Members of Charlie and Bravo companies were approaching the hideout. Thompson landed his helicopter between the bunker and U.S. troops, attempting to stall the attack. He then walked over to the ground units, telling them "to hold up" (Bigart).
There were more civilians in the bunker than Thompson had accounted for, and his small chopper would only hold an extra three or four. He contacted a nearby gunship, persuaded the pilot to land and fly the Vietnamese to a local base. Because the killing spree was distracted by Thompson's efforts, orders were finally heard by all of the American infantrymen to cease-fire (Thompson).
When Thompson arrived back at base, he shared his story with his platoon leader. The two, according to Thompson, reported the massacre to their commander, who seemed interested in confronting the issue. The next day, the commander assembled Thompson and his crew to record statements (Thompson). As far as Thompson knew, My Lai was over. However, as we know from the cover-up and court martial that followed, the My Lai "incident" was only beginning.
The My Lai massacre clearly illustrates the hazards of an unquestioning obedience to authority. Psychological research on obedience to authority and social influence shows how readily ordinary, decent people can be manipulated into obeying destructive authority or uncritically accepting supposed experts (Presley).
Following this idea, is it any wonder how the incident in My Lai was able to take place? According to Jim Linnen of Charleston, SC, who served in Vietnam, ". . . there were plenty of times where it was necessary to disobey a direct order." He gave an account of one such occasion where this would be necessary. He said, "I was a platoon leader at the time and my company commander told me to take a squad of 8 men out to set up ambushes. He wanted us to go two clicks (the equivalent of about two miles) away from the platoon, set up a parameter and look out for charlie."
After careful consideration, he decided that following those commands to the letter would have inevitably been suicide. According to him, "if we had run into charlie miles down the road, we would have been outnumbered, and reinforcements wouldn't have been able to reach us in time." He stated that at all times (during the war) you needed to "use common sense out in the field." Risking a possible court martial, he acted in what he felt was the best interest of his platoon.
He had this to say in response to Lt. Calley's actions during the My Lai massacre. "There were numerous occasions when you were sent out on missions of search and destroy . . . in military speak that means to shoot anything moving and set the village on fire . . . The results were almost always catastrophic . . . Lt. Calley was just one of the few who got called on it . . . Lt. Calley obeyed his orders but he could have used common sense if he felt the order was a bad one."
Calley contends that he was following a direct order from his company commander, Ernest Medina. Medina, who was in charge of C company, would have gotten his orders from Lt. Col. Barker. Follow the chain of command at the time back up the hierarchy and Vietnam Gen. Westmoreland is in control. In the military, the general rule of thumb is that subordinates follow orders. There can be no second-guessing. A commander's direct order should be followed expediently and exactly. This would give credence to Calley feeling that he had simply carried out the orders relayed to him by his company commander. Surely, by following the codes set forth in all of the training he'd received, any actions taken would be backed and covered by the commanding officer, which was in charge of the operation. After all, ". . . the responsibility of a commander for controlling and supervising his subordinates is the cornerstone of a responsible armed force" (Van Dyke 21).
Bearing this in mind, how is it possible that the great portion of blame for the My Lai massacre rested at the feet of one of the lowest men on the totem pole? If you follow the chain of command and assignment of responsibilities, it would appear that Lt. Barker set the events into motion by giving Capt. Medina the mission, leaving it up to him to figure out how to accomplish it. Medina, theoretically, would have assigned one of his three-rifle platoon leaders to actually carry out the order. Calley, being the platoon leader selected and taking his cues from Medina, would then commence to accomplishing the mission. Hence, the cover-up of the massacre at My Lai.
The events that followed the massacre at My Lai can only be described as attempts to mask the wrong doings of American soldiers. The cover-up was fostered by numerous accounts of false proclamations, haphazard investigation, misleading testimony, and the omission of detail. Army investigations into the massacre led by Col. Oran Henderson were, in our opinion, too brief and vague to have been a credible source of true information. Henderson's actions to suppress the true facts of the My Lai operation were perhaps the most rebellious. So why did the Army, after receiving the one and a half page report of Henderson saying that "there had been about twenty civilian casualties," take no further action into finding out the truth? (Carson 66) It appears that when confronted with the task of investigating a possible war crime and embarrassing the Army, "the investigators chose to lie about My Lai. . . " and save face (Carson 77).
Witnesses of the massacre were having a hard time keeping up appearances. One soldier, Michael Bernhart, a Charlie Company GI, was so severely troubled by what he witnessed at My Lai, he made inquiries about who to talk to about what happened. But he was quickly discouraged about doing so.
Steps to hide the truth were taken at almost every command level involved with the My Lai "incident." Whether the half truths and omissions were inadvertent or deliberate, it all culminated in the whitewashing of the event. Newspaper reports the following day in My Lai recounted stories of a victory with limited fatalities on both sides. The truth of the matter was that the crimes had included "murders by individuals and groups, rape, sodomy, maiming and assault of civilians" ("Murder").
It wasn't until the Pentagon-authorized investigation was initiated that light began to shine on the incident. One person who spearheaded the unveiling of the facts surrounding My Lai was Army Infantryman Ron Ridenhour. Through his valiant efforts and determination, the truth could finally be told. If not for him, Americans would never have learned of the atrocities and virtual cover-up of the My Lai massacre. His actions sparked the official inquiry which led to the eventual court martial of Lt. Calley.
When news of the massacre was released, the public was shocked. "How could seemingly well-educated American boys slaughter an entire village of civilians" (Hymel)? It was inconceivable that "our" boys could have done something only "others" have been known to do. This notion led to Calley being hoisted up as a virtual hero of war. He was perceived by some to have been the consummate warrior doing what a warrior should to protect democracy.
"During his trial, Calley underwent numerous psychological exams which all revealed that he was "normal" and did not suffer from any psychological diseases that would account for his behavior. Although not revealed under oath, some of his doctors claimed that he told them that he thought of killing the Vietnamese people in the same way he thought of killing animals" (Linder).
Calley's defense was loosely built around a soldier's perceived need to follow the direct orders of a superior and blatant denials of events. Riding the tide of sentiment expressed by many civilian and military supporters of Calley, his defense attorney, George Latimer tried to portray him as "the victim of a war gone bad with a diminished capacity brought on by marijuana use" (Linder). How else could he have explained away Calley's abstract disregard for human life. The defense's feeble attempt was ineffective. Lt. Calley was the only one to be found guilty of war crimes out of the 12 officers recommended for court-martial. After numerous hours of deliberation, the jury found Calley guilty of the "premeditated murder of 22 villagers of My Lai" (Linder). Before the jury reconviened to decide his punishment, Calley was allowed to address the jury and said, "Yesterday you stripped me of all my honor, please by your actions that you take here today, don't strip future soldiers of their honor-I beg you" (Linder).
After the conviction of Lt. Calley in 1971, many Americans still believed that Calley was in the right and expressed outrage over the verdict. "Many believed that the Army made Calley the scapegoat for their own failures in Vietnam" (Carson 76).
The prosecution, led by Capt. Aubrey Daniel, responded that "Calley had stripped himself of his honor by murdering women and children" (Linder). In the end, Calley was sentenced to a life of hard labor. After, countless sentence reductions and serving less than five months, President Nixon pardoned Calley.
"Now the people sees what a big mistake they done back then . . . but it's too late now, the damage has been done and will never change, history was made on that day in South Vietnam in the village of My Lai" (Crowe). And so it was. The question that still lingers in the minds of many is "will something as awful as the My Lai massacre ever happen again?" Perhaps it will, but perhaps the commanders in chief and lieutenants will look back on March 16th of 1968 and remember the horrors of what happened. Hopefully they will see both the psychological and physical effects that obeying orders, in strict adherence to the chain of command, has on human beings; preventing something like this from ever occurring again.
Still, people will argue as to whether or not My Lai was Lt. William Calley's fault or not. Some will say that he alone is to blame for the numerous innocent villagers killed on that day and for putting Charlie company at risk. Others will allocate equal blame to the superior officers who gave him his orders.
Our purpose here is not to assign blame for what happened nearly 32 years ago. We merely attempt to provide the facts and paint a picture. Maybe that was what photographer Richard Haeberle held in his subconscious all along. If he could paint a picture to others some years later, maybe they could see the horrors and terrors that war leaves behind on the battlefield.
There are no better words to summarize our report other than those of someone who experienced the My Lai massacre on a first-hand basis. So, in closing, we will end with the thoughts of one man that was at the very heart of the situation at My Lai Four - Lieutenant William Laws "Rusty" Calley:
Bibliography
Bigart, Homer. "Two My Lai Witnesses Say Citations Were False." New York Times
24 November 1970.
Bilton, Michael and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: The Penguin
Group, 1992.
Carson, Mark D. "F. Edward He'bert and the Congressional Investigation of the
My Lai Massacre." Louisiana History 37.1 (1996): 61-79.
Crowe, Sgt. Raymond A. (ret. United States Army). Expert Witness, Feb
2000.
Faculty Projects. Prof. Douglass Linder. 1999. University of Missouri - Kansas
City. Feb. 2000. http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/mylai.htm.
Hamilton, V. Lee. "Chains of Command: Responsibility Attribution in Hierarchies."
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 16. 2 (1986): 118-138.
Hewitt, Bill. "William Calley: (My Lai massacre convict)." People Weekly full-text
database 32.21 (1989). Expanded Academic ASAP. 7 February 2000.
http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark
/36/97/52044565w3/purl=rc1_GRCM_0_A81140 43&dyn=12!xrn_1_0_A8114043?sw_aep=usclibs.
Hymel, Kevin M. "A 1996 conference at Tulane University tried to sort out the U.S.
Army's most notorious atrocity - the My Lai massacre." Vietnam full-text
database 12.2 (1999). Expanded Academic ASAP. 8 February 2000.
http://web2.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/
133/745/54654185w3/purl=rc1_EAIM_0_A54982053&dyn=69!xrn_2_0_A54982053?sw_aep=usclibs
Hochreich, Dorothy J. "Internal - External Control and Reaction to the My Lai
Courts-Martial." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2.4 (1972):
319-325.
Linnen, Captain Jim (ret. United States Army). Expert Witness, Feb 2000.
"Murder in the Name of War - My Lai." BBC Online Network. 18 Mar 1998. BBC
news Home. 9 Feb 2000. http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/special%5Freport/1998/03/98/mylai/newsid%5F64000/64344.stm
Presley, Sharon. "Positive steps to becoming less vulnerable to influence and
authority: Opus Dei And other Secret Societies." Free Inquiry full-text database
Thompson, Hugh C. "My Lai conference: Tulane University". December 1994.
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai
/Myl_hero.html.
Van Dyke, Jon M. "The Laws of War". The Center Magazine 4.4 (1971): 21-33