Hilbert College

 Issues in Mass Communications:

The Media's Effect on the Outcome of the Vietnam War

Bedtime Story

Sleep, America
Silence is a warm bed.
Sleep your nightmares of small

The military and the media have never been, what one would call, kindred spirits. This may have something to do with the fact that the media often assumes somewhat of an "I told you so" attitude towards the military. The bond has certainly not strengthened since the Vietnam War. There are many who argue that the Vietnam War's outcome was directly influenced by the media's slant on the war. Because the Vietnam War was the first "television war", there are many that immediately see the direct correlation between America's first "television war" and America's first big military loss. The fact that these two events evolved simultaneously seems to be enough proof for many. As with anything related to the media, however, there are of course two sides to every story.

The media and the military have never been friends, going back as far as the American Civil War. Indiscretions by newspapers on both the North and South side of the conflict, provided useful intelligence to the other side. General Lee went so far as to complain to the Secretary of War while General Sherman banished war correspondents from his lines. In fact, he threatened summary punishment for anyone who published any information about his forces (Hooper 1982). One hundred years later, General Westmoreland found himself in a more compromising position. In late 1965 Gen. Westmoreland witnessed a TV report of the battle of Cam Be by CBS reporter Morely Safer. He told his subordinates to look into restraining television reporters as he felt they were providing too much information to the public. Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, Arthur Sylvester, recognized that any discrimination of reporters on the part of the military would cause a major outcry. He issued a policy statement to all US military commands that no distinction was to be made between television and print journalists. All information was to be "equally available... to all media representatives" (Fox 1995). Westmoreland's concern over television seems reasonable when one considers the fact that no print medium was seen by as many Americans as the nightly newscasts. In 1967, seventeen million Americans watched NBC news nightly, fourteen million watched CBS, and six million watched ABC. By 1970 thses numbers had raised significantly. Experts agree that television newscasts do shape public opinion so it seems likely that Westmoreland had reason to be worried (Small 1994).

Back in the United States, President Johnson also found the media to be an increasing problem. He, however, could not argue for its censorship based merely on the fact that it was hurting his presidency. When he first took office, virtually all big-city newspapers and national news outlets supported his objectives of the Cold War state. Journalists treated the presidency itself with deference. Slowly, however, a few editorialists and columnists began to question where Johnson's commitment to Vietnam was leading the country. They worried that Vietnam would become another Korea. While they did not testify to the "immorality" of the war, they clearly felt uneasy about Johnson's "credibility gap" or the fact that his private deeds often directly contradicted his public statements (Baughman 1988).

Before the Vietnam War, surprisingly, it was unusual for American foreign policy to be criticized by the mass media. Despite popular impressions created by a few authors and government officials, the media generally does not look favorably upon movements that oppose official policy. The media tends to support those who operate within the system and denigrate oppositional activities of ordinary citizens. Many argue that antiwar sentiment on the part of the press is what cost the United States the war. Critics focus particularly on the media's coverage of antiwar rallies. This criticism has been so severe that many journalists were nervous about covering the antiwar activities surrounding the Gulf War, especially when a rally in January of 1991 drew at least one hundred thousand participants. If anything, however, mass demonstrations have been proven to retard the growth of antiwar sentiment (Small 1994). Most antiwar journalists preferred to see the war attacked in congress and not on the street. Researchers have noted the ideological hesitancy of the press after the criticism they received following the war. The cold warriors had convinced them that criticism would foster more doubts about America's global role and threaten efforts to thwart Communist expansion (Baughman 1988).

Regardless, journalists could not sit back and bite their tongues at the risk of influencing the war movement. Journalists were often criticized by opponents of the war for repeating government press releases without questioning their claims. Arthur Sylvester once lost his temper over this very subject. At a late-night session with some Saigon correspondents, including Morley Safer and Murray Fromson, he warned them about relying too heavily on government handouts. When one newsman questioned the credibility of government spokesmen, Sylvester snapped, "Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth you're stupid" (Hammond 1988). Sylvester was right. The reporters who made the difference were the men like Bernard Fall who was never satisfied with official press releases and had to instead walk to ground himself. He covered the war from the point of view of the combat soldier or the Vietnamese peasant, thus causing the American reader to question motives and notice striking similarities between the mistakes of the French in the 1950s and the United States' present course of action. In setting the standard for a handful of journalists, he "risked and lost his life". While some writers were content to merely jazz up the government's version of the war, there was a group of correspondents who were sending some disturbing reports back home from the front. They described the war as "brutal, cruel, and bloody" and raised questions about the proper use of American power. One of the more significant messages that they sent home to the "world" was the fact that the war would not end quickly. They described a corrupt government system and the problems with the South Vietnamese army, giving a clear impression that things would not wind up as quickly and neatly as planned (Levy 1991). These reports, along with those of student protestors and members of the antiwar movement, offered much more significant information than those gained from interviewing congressional figures who had recently parted with Johnson over the Vietnam issue in the late 1960s. Such reports only served to exhibit source bias as well as to illustrate the deterioration of congressional bipartisanship in foreign policy. These sources, and not the press, were the presidency's true "adversaries" (Baughman 1988).

The American news media had had little interest in Southeast Asia during the 1940s and 1950s. Being preoccupied with the Cold War and Europe, they followed events in the region only when breaking news occurred (Hammond 1998) despite the fact that the Vietnamese had been continually at war since 1941. The media's commitment to Vietnam increased, as one would expect: with the linear increase of American military commitment. In 1954 when the United States had only 200 advisors serving overseas, there were less than 20 U.S. and foreign correspondents in Vietnam. In 1968 there were 637 correspondents that matched the continual increase of American soldiers that was 500,000 men at that time. By 1973 when American soldiers withdrew and were finally sent home, there remained only 35 journalists in Vietnam. The Joint United States Public Affairs Office also grew to meet the increasing media representation. It reached approximately six hundred staff members and provided abundant facilities for newsmen (Hooper 1982).

The relationship of the military and the media can be explained with William F. Ogburn's "cultural lag theory". The theory argues that the reason that the military never feels it is on an even playing field is because it is, in fact, always one step behind. The media will develop a new technological method with which to better gather the news. Relatively recent advances have included the satellite linkups that provided live broadcasts during Operation Desert Storm. When the media has the more advanced equipment they are in danger of breaking military ground rules on what the military feels are security measures. Suddenly, all safeguards that the military has put in place to guide the coverage of military operations no longer apply. The carefully established balance must be restored. In order to do this, the military comes up with new guidelines through either negotiation or military decree. These new guidelines give the media need for greater technology. Thus any actions by the military to limit media coverage for reasons of security are simply just good faith attempts to restore the previous media-military balance. Ogburn describes the cultural lag theory as "when one of two parts of culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts than existed previously" (Fox 1995).

When asked, the military will find very little in the way of positive remarks to say about the media. Officers in the military bring up points such as the fact that the average correspondent had absolutely no experience in the military, was unfamiliar with the U.S. military's apparatus, and the military "language" of the 1960s. They will offer the reminder that Vietnam was nothing more than a surefire way to jumpstart a career in journalism and that a year or so reporting from Saigon looked fabulous on a resume. However, they often neglect the fact that the media is a necessary evil. There must be a means of keeping the public in touch with the military. The media acts as an educational tool for the public. In return for this service, however, the armed forces have had to learn to live with the speed and impact of the tool (Hooper 1982).

The Tet Offensive in 1968 derailed the conventional assumption in Washington that America would eventually win the war. This had repercussions throughout the United States, but particularly in the media. Tet marked a major change in the self-image of America. The media had spent the first part of the war relying on government assumptions and goals. As reporters witnessed the government lose faith in its own military strength, it could not help but portray that in its coverage of the war (Gitlin 1980). By the end of 1968 almost sixty percent of the country felt that the war was a mistake and twenty percent were calling for immediate withdrawal. The year had been a turning point in that during 1967 only forty-five percent of Americans disagreed with the war and only ten percent wished to withdraw American forces (Levy 1991). It is also interesting to note that it was after the Tet Offensive that the press began to cover the anti-war rallies and protests that it had ignored previously. There are many that argue, however, that the press was not leaning more heavily towards the anti-war movement but merely giving it more fair coverage than it had given before the Tet Offensive. Journalists may have even been responding directly to the Nixon administration's direct attacks against them, especially the three networks and the Times and the Post. Nixon had clearly taken over where Johnson had left off in terms of his relations with the press. The day after Johnson announced that he would not seek another term in office, he blamed television on forcing him to seek that position. The networks were Johnson's "most visible adversary" that year, he and his administration believed, especially with Walter Cronkite as an anchor for CBS. The administration firmly believed that Cronkite was "out to get" the president (Small 1994). A study dealing with military-media relations was completed at the War College in 1969. It was based on the statistical analysis of Tet coverage by the major national media, print and broadcast. Its conclusions have been supported by subsequent studies and are as follows:

"...the Tet Offensive was an Allied victory... portrayed inaccurately to the American people and thereby [it] resulted in psychological defeat... Allied victory in Vietnam is adjudged from the disproportionate and awesome military losses suffered by the enemy; the favorable performance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces; the failure of the people to support the Viet Cong; and the endurance in adversity... evidenced by the Government of South Vietnam." (Kennedy 1993)

In 1973 when we lost the war and in 1975 when we lost the country of Vietnam, the loss was marked by its absence in the marketplace. With its loss, it disappeared from the academic and cultural industry. It quietly slipped away from the classrooms and television that it had invaded over the last decade. For years, homes had been flooded with television shows like ABC Scope, NBC's Vietnam Weekly Review and CBS's Vietnam Perspective. While the military argued that this was the first "living room" war, that is not accurate. During World War II, news was broadcast into homes via the radio. The difference, however, was that the radio either reported or dramatized the news. Television did open up another front. Suddenly, the military was battling for American public opinion (Hooper 1982). With television, families witnessed the cruelty of war. "Parents had the pleasure of seeing their children or the children of others blown away right before the weather and just after the sports roundup." Through television, families became intimately acquainted with the war even though the correspondents mediated it all. After 1973, however, the visions of Vietnam faded from the screen. The major networks took it off the air and thus began the respectful silence that reigned for the next four years. It only reappeared briefly on April 29, 1975 when the war ended and the networks bid adieu with special reports that summed up the last ten years (Berg 1991).

This silence has been everlasting in the eyes of many of the veterans. They returned to a country that wanted to forget the circumstances surrounding the war. The media helped citizens achieve the desired silence that people craved by simply not bringing the subject up again. The subject would only reemerge in the 1980s under the disguise of John Wayne or Rambo. Yet there were so many questions that still remained unanswered. Veterans were forced to "become" the media in order to reach America and tell their stories. Since the war, literally thousands of books have been published on the Vietnam War, written mostly by veterans who wish to analyze the war from their own point of view. Those writers are the people who have truly preserved an accurate account of the war and its aftermath, through books such as Philip Caputo's Rumor of War which follows a man through his tour of duty and Born on the Fourth of July by Ron Kovic which instead follows a soldier home from war as he adjusts to civilian life as a amputee. There will forever be discrepancy surrounding whether the media actually has the power to influence war. The military will often blame the press for the outcome of a war but in reality, the military might as well blame the evolution of technology. As long as we continue to encourage scientific advancement, we cannot discourage the media's influence on war. In the United States, Americans value the freedom of the press, perhaps above war's final score.

Aronson, James. "Mediations." Antioch Review. 50.1-2 (1992): 176-189.

Discusses the governments assault of the media beginning with carefully planned editorials sent in to various papers across the nation. It then escalated to a storm of telephone calls, letters, a telegrams pledging support for the Agnew-Nixon position. Finally, it discusses the volume and "balance" or lack thereof of coverage of major speeches and the reaction to them. He suggests that the forces that control the American press have no quarrel with the political system. If they become restless about a situation, they bend over backwards to demonstrate their fairness, thereby avoiding the other side coming out on top.

Baughman, James L. "The Self-Publicist from the Pedernales: Lyndon Johnson and the Press." Diplomatic History. 12.1 (1988): 103-110.

Highlights the fact that Johnson felt he had a lot to live up to after Kennedy's assassination. His "war on poverty" was highly acclaimed and his dream for a "Great Society" permeated the lives of many Americans. Among the big-city newspapers, Johnson enjoyed considerable favor. Initially, they even endorsed the Cold War state. However, the press began to handle American foreign policy more critically with the Vietnam War. Initially, most reporters and editors were favorably disposed towards the war but that changed as time went on. Many worried that Vietnam would become another Korea.

Berg, Rick and John Carlos Rowe, ed. The Vietnam War and American Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

The Vietnam Was has been covered with more intensity that any other war. Soldiers returned from the front and decided to express their feelings about their involvement on paper. Since the war had been a "television" war, literature's function changed. People wanted to be familiar with the cultural, political, and economic forces that led the country to war. This explores how the war was portrayed to the public and also how the enemy was portrayed.

Braestrup, Peter. Big Story. Abr. ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

This gives an abridged version of the study mentioned below. He puts the numerical values of his research into words. He concentrates on the initial years when the press corps first made its way to Vietnam, discussing the first reports from the country. He also discusses the civilian death toll and its affect on the American public as well as the performance of U.S. troops.

---. Big Story. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. Vol. 2.

Original study presented by Braestrup. Statistics are presented that indicate when certain news was televised during the conflict and whether it was slanted toward the war movement or against it. The story is summarized and I linked with the television station that aired it. Conversations between reporters and television stations are also excerpted so as to give an indication of whether reporters were sending back tainted information.

Brown, Capt. James B. "Media Access to the Battlefield." Military Review. 72.7 (1992): 10-20.

In a general model of communication, the operation performed by the transmitter is called encoding. The receiver reverses the operation of the transmission and reconverts the coded message by decoding it. In the process of decoding, there is always the possibility of error. The errors may occur in any stage of transit. All sources of error are put in the same category - noise.

Fox, Lt. Col. Terrance M. "Closing the Media-Military Technology Gap." Military Review. 75.6 (1995): 10-16.

The military is concerned because of the advanced technological methods used to gather information now. They question whether anything can be censored with satellite link-ups, etc. This is a cause for concern in relation to American safety abroad. This discusses the cultural lag theory in that when the media adopts an innovation in news-gathering technology, the old rules no longer apply and the military safeguards no longer protect operations security. There must then be a readjustment period at which time the media comes up with yet another technological improvement.

Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkley: University of California Press, 1980.

Deals with the mass media, the New Left, and their relations during the Vietnam War, describing the conflict over control of the public cultural space. People's beliefs and loyalties lack deep tradition. They are influenced by rumors, gossip, trend, fashion, and of course come to be reliant on the mass media in order to form their opinions. The mass media distributes ideology. Journalists must conform to journalistic notions in order to offer information that is "newsworthy". Too often, flamboyance is mistaken for "newsworthy" material.

Hammond, William M. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Discusses media's changing interest in Vietnam and Southeast Asia in general. The followed the breaking news only when something of magnanimous proportion occurred. Official agencies had little control over what was reported. The French Colonial government set up a system of censorship but reporters could easily report whatever they wanted. The deaths of four civilians overseas in 1960 changed all this. Policy makers continued to try to close off information. This deals with the reporting in Vietnam as well as the reactions at home upon receiving such reports.

Hooper, Alan. The Military and the Media. Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing Company, Ltd., 1982.

Introduces the facts about the media, delving into newspapers, television, radio, documentaries, and drama. It includes building a better understanding of the Vietnam lesson as well as the Northern Ireland experience. Reporting and the media's lack of knowledge about the military heavily influenced the two conflicts. The book encourages the military to be educated about the media so as to better deal with public relations issues.

Kennedy, William V. The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

As the title suggests, a strong argument is made against the media's accuracy in wartime situations. The military cannot be insulated from public scrutiny because that would end up destroying the people the establishment was supposed to protect. However, the independence of the free press under the First Amendment may seriously affect the outcome of war.

Levy, David W. The Debate Over Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Never before has a war in American history caused so much debate. Families were split in half over the debate. While policy was being made by intellectuals and experts in Washington, journalists were at work raising troublesome questions about such policy. They were often criticized by opponents of the war for repeating government press releases without questioning their authenticity while at the same time they were criticized for depicting a cruel, brutal war that made American's reconsider the reasons they were even involved.

Prochau, William. Once Upon a Distant War. New York: Times Books, 1995.

Mentions the importance of the body count on the reports and how American sympathy could be estimated by the body count for the week. In the beginning, the reporters began to report the conflict but the population was not interested because it did not directly affect them. Slowly, however, the number of soldiers crept up and more people began to tune in. It also describes the desire for American reporters to dramatize in order to add an element of adventure.

Small, Melvin. Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994.

Questions the misrepresentation of the antiwar movement as well as the war itself. Critics still contend that the United States could have won the war had it not been for the press's embrace of anti-war arguments and perspectives. In fact, the media was nervous about covering antiwar activities during the Gulf War in 1991 for fear of the same charge. Oppositional mass movements often have a difficult time obtaining fair and favorable coverage.

Vlastos, Stephen. "Television Wars: Representations of the Vietnam War in Television Documentaries." Radical History Review. 36 (1986): 115-132.

There is a strong analogy between the Sandinista revolution and the Vietnamese war of national liberation because of the trauma of defeat. Since television was the primary source for information during the era, concern is placed on the documentary and what it showed Americans. Since the war's conclusion, documentaries have come out arguing both sides of the story - that of the media and the military. Many faults are identified with various PBS series that identified the issues in Vietnam.